Abstract. We present a model checking procedure and its implementation for the automatic verification of embedded systems. Systems are represented by Hybrid Automata-machines with finite control and realvalued variables modeling continuous environment parameters such as time, pressure, and temperature. System properties are specified in a real-time temporal logic and verified by symbolic computation. The verification procedure, implemented in Mathematica, is used to prove digital controllers and distributed algorithms correct. The verifier checks safety, liveness, time-bounded, and duration properties of hybrid automata.
Introduction
A hybrid system consists of a discrete program that is embedded in a continuously changing environment and interacts with the environment in real time. More and more real-life processes, from elevators to aircraft, are controlled by such programs. Obviously, correctness is of vital importance for hybrid systems. Yet traditional program verification methods allow us, at best , to approximate continuously changing environments by discrete sampling. Only recently there have been some attempts to develop a verification methodology for hybrid systems [MP93, NOSY931.
In this paper, we pursue the approach suggested in [ACHH93] for solving reachability problems of hybrid systems. We present progress in three directions. First, we generalize the system model to accommodate, in addition to piecewise linear functions, also linearly-bounded functions. Second, we extend the method to verify, in addition to reachability properties, also liveness, time-bounded, and duration prop- Hybrid automata. We model hybrid systems by Hybrid Automata [ACHH93] . A hybrid automaton is a generalized finite-state machine with both discrete and continuous variables. As usual, the discrete transitions of a program are modeled by the changing of a program counter that ranges over a finite set of control locations. In addition, the global state of a hybrid automaton changes continuously with time according to the laws of physics: for each control location, the continuous activities of the environment are governed by a set of differential equations. This model for hybrid systems is inspired by the Phase Transition Systems of [MMPSl] and [NSYSl] , and can be viewed as a generalization of Timed Automata [AD90]; a similar model has been proposed and studied independently in [NOSY93] .
We restrict ourselves to Linear Hybrid Automata (Section 2). Each continuous variable of a linear hybrid automaton behaves according to an arbitrary function with constant lower and upper bounds on the rate of change (the bounds on the rate of change may be different for different control locations). In this formalism we can model, for instance, distance assuming constant speed, and the local clocks of a distributed system assuming bounded drift.
Model checking.
We consider the problem of model checking for hybrid systems. Model checking is a powerful technique for the automatic verification of finite-state systems: a model checking algorithm determines whether a mathematical model of a system satisfies a specification that is given as a temporallogic formula. For discrete finite-state systems, model checking has a long history spanning over a dozen years, and has been successful in validating protocols and circuits [CESSS, McM931. In recent years, model checking algorithms have been developed also for real-time systems-discrete programs with realvalued timers [AFHSl, HNSY92, ACD931.
Real-time properties of hybrid systems can be specified in the logic TCTL [ACD93] , which extends the branching-time temporal logic CTL with timing constraints. We use Integrator Computation Tree Logic, ICTL, which strengthens TCTL in the style of [BES93] by admitting integrator variables (Section 3). While TCTL is meant for the specification of time-bounded propertiesauch as "A response is obtained if a ringer has been pressed continuously for at least d seconds"-integrator variables can express constraints about accumulated delays and are useful to specify duration propertiesauch as "A response is obtained if a ringer has been pressed, possibly intermittently, for at least d seconds."
A symbolic model checking algorithm for verifying TCTL-specifications of a real-time system is presented in [HNSY92] . It has been observed in [ACHH93] and in [NOSY931 that the primitives of this algorithm can be redefined to obtain a model checking procedure for constant-slope hybrid systems, in which each variable changes at a piecewise-constant rate. We extend this result to linearly-bounded functions, and introduce a model checking procedure for ICTL-properties of linear hybrid automata (Section 4). The termination of the procedure is guaranteed only for restricted classes of hybrid systems-indeed, already the reachability problem is undecidable for constant-slope hybrid systems [ACHH93, KPSY931. Notwithstanding, we have found that the procedure terminates for all systems we have attempted to verify. The undecidability result, by contrast , depends on a contrived hybrid automaton that encodes a Turing machine.
Symbolic computation.
The symbolic model checking procedure for verifying ICTL-formulas over linear hybrid automata has been implemented in Mathematica. The procedure symbolically manipulates linear formulas over real-valued variables (Section 5). We illustrate the method and its implementation with two examples (Section 6). First, we verify several properties of a controller for a railroad crossing. Second, we verify the mutualexcJusion property of a timing-based mutual-exclusion protocol with distributed, unsynchronized local clocks.
We also demonstrate an additional advantage of the symbolic approach to verification. Although, in theory, the computational complexity of the verification problem is proportional to the magnitudes of the system delays, in practice the performance of the symbolic procedure is quite insensitive to the size of delays. Indeed, in place of concrete values for system delays, we can use symbolic parameters and our procedure will output sufficient and necessary constraints on these parameters for the system to satisfy the desired property. Such a symbolic delay analysis can help the' system designer to choose crucial delays. 
A labeling function p3 that assigns to each transition e = ( L I P ) E E a guarded command pS(e).
A guarded command is a guarded set 4 + (z := a, I z E V D ) of assignments, where the guard 4 is a data predicate and each a, is either a data function, or a data predicate that contains only the variable z. An assignment of the form 2 := $, where 3 is a formula, indicates that the value of the variable z is changed nondeterministically to any real number such that the formula $ becomes true. For example, the assignment z := (z > 10) changes the value of z nondeterministically to any value greater than 10. We write p3(e, E ) for the expression a,.
The transition e is enabled in the automaton state ( m , u ) E C iff m = L and the guard 4 is true in the data state a. The automaton state (m', U') E C is an e-successor of (m, a) if (1) the transition e is enabled in (m, a), (2) m4 = E, and (3) for all data variables z E V', either a= is a term and U'(.) = a(a,), or a, is a formula that is true in d.
Semantics
At any time instant, the state of a hybrid automaton specifies a control location and values for all data variables. The state can change in two ways: (1) by an instantaneous transition that changes both the control location and the values of data variables, or (2) by a time delay that changes only the values of data variables in a continuous manner according to the rate interval of the current control location.
An interval is a nonempty convex subset of the non- A trace is a function from R+ to C. Equivalently, a trace r is a set of real-valued functions r(z) from R+ In other words, A is nonZeno if every finite prefix of a run of A is a prefix of a divergent run of A . We shall consider nonZeno hybrid automata only. In [HNSY92] it is shown how an automaton may be turned into an equivalent nonZeno automaton by strengthening the location invariants.
Composition
A hybrid system typically consists of many components that operate concurrently and communicate with each other. We describe each component as a linear hybrid automaton. To facilitate the coordination between various system components, we use synchronization labels on the automaton transitions. The linear hybrid automaton that models the entire system is then constructed from the component automata using a product operation that is defined in the standard way (see, for instance, [ACHH93] or the full version of this paper).
Example: Railroad gate controller
We model a control system for a railroad crossing using linear hybrid automata. The system consists of three processes-a train, a gate, and a gate controller.
The train moves at a speed that varies between 48 and 52 meters per second. When the train approaches, a sensor placed at a distance of 1,000 meters from the crossing detects the train and sends the signal app to the controller. If the controller is idle, it waits for 5 seconds before sending the command lower to the gate. The gate is then lowered from a height of 2.5 meters at the constant rate of 0.5 meters per second. A second sensor placed 100 meters after the crossing detects the leaving train and signals exit to the controller, which causes the controller, after another delay of 5 seconds, to command raise to the gate. The distance between trains is at least 10,100 meters, so when the sensor detects a leaving train, the next (or returning) train is at least 10,000 meters from the crossing.
The three hybrid automata that model the train, the gate, and the controller are shown in Figure 1 .
The signals are modeled by synchronization labels on transitions. For instance, when the train automaton changes location using an edge labeled with app, the controller automaton is required to take a transition The formulas of ICTL contain three kinds of variables-the control variable of A , the data variables of A , and integrators. An integrator is a clock that can be stopped and restarted. We adopt the notation from [BES93] and replace the clock reset quantifier 2.9 of TCTL [ACD93] by the integrator reset quantifier ( z : p ) . cp, where p is a location predicate called the type of the integrator z that is bound ("reset") by the quantifier (in the full version of this paper, we admit arbitrary state predicates as integrator types). An integrator of type p increases with the rate at which time advances whenever p is true, and stays unchanged whenever p is false.
Syntax
The formulas of ICTL are built from location predicates and from linear constraints on data variables and integrators by boolean connectives, the two temporal operators 3.4 (possibly) and VU (inevitably), and the reset quantifier for integrators. Intuitively, the formula cp13Ucpz holds in the automaton state U if along some automaton trace that starts from U , the second argument cpz becomes true and the first argument cp1 is true in all intermediate states; the formula (p1VUpp2 asserts that along every trace that starts from U , the first argument cp1 is true until the second argument cpz becomes true. where p is a location predicate of A , 4 is a linear formula over VI and z is an integrator. An ICTLformula cp is closed if every occurrence of an integrator in cp is bound by a reset quantifier. We restrict ourselves to closed formulas of ICTL.
Semantics
Let cp be an ICTL-formula that contains the integra- 
Example: Railroad gate controller
To illustrate the use of ICTL, let us consider once more the railroad gate controller of Section 2. We require the following properties of the controller. The safety property 4 0 ---$ 'VO(z < 10 -+ pe[gate] = closed) asserts that whenever a train is within 10 meters of the gate, the gate must be closed. Since the safety requirement is met by a controller that keeps the gate closed forever, we add the liveness (response) property
---$ VOVO(pc[gate] = open)
that the gate will always open again. Indeed, this infinitary liveness requirement may not be satisfactory (imagine you're in a car waiting to cross at a closed gate!), so we may wish to require instead the stronger time-bounded response property
do -V O V O~Z~ (pc[gate] = open)
that the gate will always open within 25 seconds.
To demonstrate the use of integrators, we propose the additional requirement that within any time interval longer than an hour, the gate is open at least 80% of the time. This duration property can be expressed in ICTL by the formula In [HNSY92] , a symbolic model checking algorithm SMC is presented for the verification of TCTLproperties of timed automata. We now generalize the SMC-algorithm to verify ICTL-properties of a given nonZeno linear hybrid automaton A.
Reachability relations
In moving from a discrete next-state relation to a dense time domain, we first need to define a notion of "step" for the execution of hybrid automata. We consider a single step to consist of a time delay followed by an instantaneous transition followed by a time delay. This notion of step is formalized using the following reachability relations between automaton states. We write =SI,,+ for the intersection +t,+ n =Sr,+. Reachability. The reachability relation j j , E C2 of the automaton A is the reflexive-transitive closure of the single-step relation J+. Given a linear hybrid automaton A and two states a1 and a2 of A, the reachability problem if a1 =$* a2 is undecidable [ACHH93] . We compute the pre-operator according to the definition of the single-step relation, by composing weakest preconditions for the transition-step and time-step relations. This is done separately for each automaton transition and each automaton location. We also assume that the invariant of each location is convex (i.e., a conjunction of atomic formulas). This can always be achieved by splitting locations.
Computing weakest preconditions
We first compute the weakest precondition of a data predicate 4, with respect to the transition-step relation +, for a given transition e = ( t 1 , t z ) of A. We We next compute the weakest precondition of the data predicate 4, with respect to the time-step relation *lr,+, for a given location t of A; the weakest preconditions for the time-step relations *I,+ and *T,+ can be computed similarly. Splitting locations if necessary, we assume that the data predicate $ is convex. We write p r e , l r [~] ( L , 4) for the data predicate defining the set of data states a E C D such that 6, is 8 true for some data state d E CO with ( t , u ) *lr,+ (t, U'). As both $ and the invariant o f t are convex, (e, U ) +lr,+ (e, U ' ) iff in location e, starting from the data state a, it is possible to reach the data state a' along a straight-line trace with slope in p l ( t , Z) such that the invariant of t and the state predicate 11, are true along the way. Therefore, if dl is the invariant of the location t and [Z, fl is the rate interval of e, then 
Computing characteristic predicates
The characteristic set of an ICTL-formula cp is the set of states U E C of the automaton A such that 'p is true in a. For linear hybrid automata, all characteristic sets will turn out to be definable by state predicates; that is, for every ICTL-formula cp there is astate predicate 4 such that for all automaton states a E C, U EA 4 iff 4 is true in a. We call 4 the characteristic predicate of 'p for A, denoted by (VIA.
Given an ICTL-formula cp, the symbolic model checking procedure SMC attempts to compute the characteristic predicate lcpl~. To see if the automaton A meets the requirement cp, then, we check if the state predicate lcpl~ is valid (i.e., true in all states of A) using a decision procedure for linear formulas.
The SMC-procedure computes the characteristic predicate I ' p l~ in two steps. First, we observe that I ' p l~ = I'~IA,, where A, is the extension of the automaton A with the integrators of the formula 'p. Second, the state predicate Icpl~, is computed inductively on the structure of p:
Procedure SMC:
Input:
Output:
A nonZeno linear hybrid automaton A and an ICTL-formula cp.
The characteristic predicate lcpl~, .
In the following, we write I t , !l short for I $ J [ A, : Since the reachability problem for linear hybrid automata is undecidable, the approximation se-
. . may not converge within a finite number of steps. The SMC-procedure, therefore, will not always terminate. If the SMC-procedure does terminate-as in the examples of Section 6-it yields the desired characteristic predicate of the input formula. This partial correctness property, and in particular the computation of inevitabilities, is established similarly to the correctness proof of the SMCalgorithm for timed automata [HNSY92] .
that. ~y ,~~,~~ mpzin.
Symbolic Model Checking: -The Implementation
The symbolic model checking algorithm has been implemented in Mathematica, which is an ideal testbed for programs requiring the symbolic manipulation of formulas. In the following, we discuss some of the issues related to the implementation. More details are presented in the full version of this paper.
Quantifier elimination. When computing the preoperator from its definition, we need to eliminate quantifiers from linear formulas. The quantifier elimination can be achieved by a decision procedure for the theory of real numbers with addition. We first implemented the (theoretically optimal) decision procedure of Ferrante and Rackoff [FR75] . The practical performance of this method, however, is not good, perhaps because we need to deal only with quantified formulas in a particular form. It turned out that the following "naive" quantifier elimination procedure performs better in our case. Consider the formula 36. (b, where (b is a conjunction of linear inequalities (remember that existential quantifiers distribute over disjunction). We first "solve each conjunct for 6"; that is, we convert each conjunct into the form 6 -t , for -€ {<,I,>,>)
Then we combine all consistent pairs of conjuncts to eliminate the variable 6. For example, the two conjuncts 6 > x + 3 and 6 5 4y are combined to the new conjunct 4y > 2+3. Finally we drop the quantifier 36.
Linear programming. During a verification task, we need to check the validity of state predicates (1) to see if an approximation sequence for the characteristic set of a temporal formula has converged, and (2) to see if the resulting characteristic predicate of the input formula is true in all automaton states. The verifier determines the validity of state predicates using linear programming. We first convert each linear formula into disjunctive normal form. Then for each disjunct, which is a conjunction, the linear programming algorithm of Mathematica decides if that conjunction of linear inequalities has a solution. This is an exponential decision procedure for state predicates, whose satisfiability problem is NP-complete [HNSY92] .
Rewrite rules. During a verification task, we continuously simplify state predicates using rewrite rules. It is worth noting that the repeated simplification of state predicates is, overall, the most time-consuming computation of the verifier.
Examples
We now illustrate the application of our verifier with two examples. First we automatically prove the safety and time-bounded response properties of the railroad gate controller of Section 2. Second, we automatically derive sufficient and necessary constraints on the timing delays of a timing-based mutual exclusion protocol.
Verification: Railroad gate controller
The safety requirement of Section 3 can be written as implies the negation of the state predicate $. Detailed listings of the actual input and output to the verifier, as well as the verification of the time-bounded response property, are given in the full version of this paper.
Delay derivation: Timing-based mutual exclusion
One of the advantages of a symbolic model checking procedure is that we can attempt to verify system descriptions with unknown constants (parameters). Thus our verifier may be used to design the delay parameters of a system. Consider the mutualexclusion problem for an asynchronous distributed system with local clocks. The system consists of two processes PI and P2 with atomic read and write operations on a shared memory. Each process has a critical section, and at every time instant at most one of the two processes is allowed to be in its critical section.
Mutual exclusion can be ensured by a version of Fischer's protocol, which we first describe in pseudocode. To complicate matters, we assume that the two local clocks of the processes PI and PZ proceed at different rates. Indeed, the rates of the clocks may vary The characteristic predicate of this formula, as computed by our verifier, is the state predicate k = 0 A (a 2 b V lla 2 86).
$:
It follows that the system satisfies the mutualexclusion property precisely in the states in which $ is false. Therefore, if we choose the delay parameters Q and b such that 86 > lla, then the protocol guarantees mutual exclusion. A further advantage of the symbolic model checking approach is its insensitivity to the magnitude of constants in the specification. To demonstrate this, we performed the following experiment. We verified the mutual-exclusion property on automata that are identical except for the values of the parameters Q and b. We chose the test data points to differ by multiples of lo2: first Q = 2 and b = 4, then a = 200 and b = 400, up to a = 2 . 10l8 and b = 4 . 1Ol8. We found that, for this example, the time taken by the verifier is almost independent of the magnitude of the parameter values.
Future work
Our current implementation represents state sets as logical formulas (state predicates). We need to search for more efficient representations of state sets to verify complex systems. In the absence of any continuous variables, considerable success has been reported in verifying complex systems using state set representations that are based on binary decision diagrams [McM93] . In the case of timed automata, sets of clock values can be represented efficiently using integer 
